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ABSTRACT 
Military operations within the last decade have seen enormous growth in the fielding and 
utilization of unmanned tele-operated vehicles in the air, ground, and maritime domains. 
With advances in computing and processing technology, these vehicles and systems are 
becoming increasingly autonomous in nature and will continue to evolve in the future, 
significantly impacting the warfighter and the battlespace.  
A great deal of research and development (R&D) is currently underway by the 
Department of Defense (DoD), as well as in industry and academia, in the field of 
autonomous systems. As the technology in this area rapidly advances, comparatively 
little is known about how these systems will affect our future organizational and 
Command and Control (C2) architectures, or their implications for the future of warfare 
in general. This thesis catalogues the current and emerging technologies associated with 
these systems, within the context of the capabilities they bring to the warfighter. From 
this baseline, an analysis of future capabilities is conducted against selected maritime 
operations as identified in the Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL). Impact to organizational 
performance is analyzed using the Congruence Model, and possible implications are 
drawn about the near-term future of naval operations and organizational change.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
The rapid, widespread, and relatively recent introduction of advanced Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems (UVS) into the modern operating environment has greatly impacted 
how the U.S. Armed Forces is planning for and conducting its various missions. UVS, 
particularly within the air domain, have become mature and preferred assets to the 
operational commander for missions such as persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as limited strike opportunities. The preference for these 
systems is quickly transitioning to dependence on them as UVS continue to evolve in 
capability and versatility.  
A major aspect of that evolution is the trend toward system autonomy. As 
computer programming and processing technology continues to advance, the capability 
of these systems to operate independent of direct human control is expanded greatly. This 
autonomous capability will continue to develop in the future, as the Department of 
Defense (DoD) invests ever-increasing sums of money and resources in the field. 
Numerous Research and Development (R&D) efforts are currently underway within the 
department, industry, and academia aimed at solving the complex problems associated 
with system autonomy and robotics capability. Service and individual agency strategy 
documents, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and master plans are beginning to address 
autonomy as a necessary and desirable attribute of future UVS. The Department 
recognizes that these systems will take on an even greater role in the future battlespace 
environment.  
Automation of commercial and military related tasks has been an ongoing, 
incremental progression for much of the past century as technology has continued to 
drive innovation and organization productivity. Utilizing machine automation for 
relatively simple, mundane tasks releases other assets and resources and allows for 
streamlining of organization business processes. Automation of modern military related 
operations and tasks however, with their inherently dangerous and dynamic nature, is 
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exceedingly more complex and requires certain levels of machine awareness and decision 
making capability. Continuing to remove the human from both the non-kinetic, and 
eventually kinetic, missions and tasks suggests an impending revolution in military 
affairs. Modern UVS, like those so favored in Iraq and Afghanistan, represent the next 
step toward system autonomy and artificial intelligence that can not only perform simple 
military related support tasks, but entire mission sets. The continued development and 
fielding of these advanced systems into the dynamic operating environments the U.S. 
military will likely find itself in the future implies major changes in how we train, 
organize for, and execute our missions.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While the technologies and associated capabilities of autonomous vehicle systems 
(AVS) continue to progress rapidly, comparatively little is known about how these 
systems will impact the future operating environment. Likewise, incorporating truly 
autonomous, intelligent systems into existing organizational structures and Command and 
Control (C2) architectures has not been fully explored. Technology is once again ahead 
of appropriate guidance and doctrine for effective utilization. While this thesis does not 
intend to provide detailed guidance for the employment of future AVS, it does aim to 
identify implications and gain insight into how these systems will impact our warfighting 
ability and organizational structures. Thus, this research will seek to answer the following 
questions: 
 How will the rapidly emerging technologies and capabilities associated 
with advanced AVS affect the future of C2 and organizational structures 
and how will they need to evolve, particularly within the maritime 
environment?  
 How will the future of information superiority and decision making be 
affected by intelligent, and potentially collaborative, AVS? 
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C. METHODOLOGY  
This research will provide background into the current state of unmanned and 
autonomous systems development and employment in the air, ground, and maritime 
domains. In addition, it will identify the necessary features and components that comprise 
modern AVSs, as well as document some expected technological advances and 
associated capabilities they bring to the warfighter. Analysis of major DoD strategy 
documents, master plans, and R&D efforts provides the framework for future system 
capabilities expected to available to the warfighter within the next 10 years.  
With a set of expected capabilities identified, analysis focuses on future system 
employment in the maritime domain. Review of the Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL) 
reveals operational mission sets that are likely to be impacted heavily by the introduction 
of advanced AVSs. Analysis of common performance metrics across mission sets 
provides a means to quantify the necessary basic capability of a future system to achieve 
mission success in any context. These mission sets are further analyzed against the future 
technologies and associated system components those technologies will support in the 
accomplishment of mission related tasks.  
This research goes on to present a model for the study of organizational 
performance and then applies that model to the introduction of advanced AVSs to the 
maritime operating environment. The model lays out a framework for understanding of 
organizational dynamics as related to performance and can be used as a methodology for 
implementation of change. A short vignette is presented to further illustrate the capability 
realized in an operational scenario. Finally, implications are drawn about the nature of 
future warfare and organizational impact as a result of intelligent, autonomous systems.  
D. SCOPE 
A broad survey of UVS and AVS development and employment identifies what is 
possible with these systems in current military operations. Further review of strategic 
level guidance reveals the expected roles these systems might fill in the future, and how 
they are expected to support the warfighter. Analysis is maritime domain/operations 
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specific and limited in timescale to expected technology readiness and capability 
delivered within the next decade. The impact of AVS on tactical and operational level 
information and decision superiority is explored, along with how naval organizational 
structures would need to change to best capitalize on emerging capability.  
Although this thesis aims to layout a framework of future implications, discussion 
of autonomous employment of firepower and the governing of lethality will not be 
explored. The complex legal and ethical problems associated with this aspect of machine 
automation still require detailed national level policy analysis and review. Likewise the 
incorporation and complete integration of highly intelligent AVS into multiple joint 
warfare operating constructs is not a topic of this research.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II provides background and literature review into the current state of 
unmanned and autonomous vehicle employment within the DoD. The recognized 
organizational impacts of unmanned vehicles, as well as current capabilities and 
limitations of AVS, also are described. Chapter III establishes the necessary components 
of AVS, and develops a set of expected future near-term capabilities based on current 
applied research efforts.  From this baseline, an analysis of future autonomous capability 
is conducted against selected maritime operations as identified in the NTTL. From the 
study of what is scientifically possible as well as what is likely possible in the near-term, 
Chapter IV will analyze the impact of machine autonomy to the Navy as an organization.  
Chapter V provides implications and recommendations for future research.  
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II. LITERATURE AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW  
A. UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
Each service component within the DoD recognizes the need to further harness 
and integrate the capabilities and value that UVS are bringing to the warfighter. Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead, in a recent speech given at the 
Brookings Institution in Washington, stated that it is imperative upon the Navy to invest 
in and field unmanned technologies and capabilities that best augment existing platforms 
(The Brookings Institution, 2009). Further, it is imperative that the Navy continues to 
develop new operating concepts with these systems in mind. These imperatives are true 
for all the services, as evidenced by the endorsement of a DoD capstone strategy 
document for unmanned systems integration.   
1. DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap  
In April 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published the 
FY2009–FY2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap. The purpose of this capstone 
document was to provide strategic guidance and vision for integrating and capitalizing on 
the various unmanned technologies being provided to the warfighter. The Roadmap 
recommends unmanned technologies and capabilities to pursue that best support the 
accomplishment of the Department’s goals and missions, with specific focus on how 
future unmanned investments must be interoperable and supportive of the warfighter 
(OSD, 2009).  
The document describes the current state of UVS within the air domain, within 
the context of their proven capability to perform persistent ISR missions in support of 
traditional forces, as well as their ability for dynamic re-tasking across the battlespace as 
needed by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) (OSD, 2009). Some larger unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS), such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper, can operate 
beyond line of sight (BLOS), allowing the remote pilot and sensor operator to control the 
vehicle from bases in the United States, outside the operating environment. These larger 
UAS, with advanced onboard sensors and satellite communications links, are employed 
in theater ISR as well as limited strike roles on targets of opportunity. A variety of 
smaller UAS, such as the RQ-11 Pathfinder Raven and RQ-7 Shadow, are rapidly being 
employed at the tactical (Brigade, Company, and Platoon) level, providing short-term line 
of sight (LOS) ISR capability. The document acknowledges the relative lead in 
technology development and employment within the air domain, and thus is focused 
somewhat on the integration and investment of these systems in particular. Figure 1 












Figure 1.   RQ-11 Pathfinder Raven UAV (From OSD, 2009) 
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) also provide tactical commanders with 
increased mission capability, while at the same time reducing risk to personnel. Since the 
beginning of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, some 6,000 UGVs have been 
procured and deployed in theater conducting missions ranging from reconnaissance for 
infantry and support units to Improvised Explosive Device (IED) defeat (OSD, 2009). An 
example of one Program of Record (POR) UGV currently deployed is the Man 
Transportable Robotic System (MTRS), MK 4 Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD). 
Research into employing UGVs in a variety of other roles including combat casualty 
evacuation and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) detection is 
currently ongoing.  
Within the maritime domain, the Navy is continuing to research and employ 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) as well as Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) 
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that enhance the concepts of fleet transformation and force multiplication. UUVs present 
a unique opportunity to conduct remote coastal surveillance as well as mine 
countermeasure missions, while USVs are envisioned conducting maritime ISR as well as 
port security functions.  
2. Organizational Impact of Unmanned Vehicles  
Unmanned systems are beginning to impact every aspect of Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
analysis. DOTMLPF is intended to support the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) process. JCIDS aims to identify, and then help field, 
critical capabilities required by warfighters across all the services to support national 
security as well as DoD missions and objectives (CJCS, 2009). As UVS technologies 
rapidly advance, policy and doctrine are catching up in the form of tailored CONOPS, 
master plans, and employment guidance from operational commanders.  
Regardless of technology, one of the most critical assets any organization can 
possess and leverage is its people. Unmanned systems are changing the way we train and 
use our personnel within the organization, as is evidenced by the introduction of 
specialized designators, ratings, and job qualifications. Until recently, for example, the 
Air Force used traditionally trained aviators to pilot their quickly emerging UAS fleet. 
Now, however, the service has implemented a non-traditional UAS pilot training program 
for officers, and a new sensor operator pipeline for enlisted personnel. Unmanned 
systems courses also have been added to the curriculum at the academy. Intelligence, 
maintenance, and logistics support personnel will continue to be sourced from traditional 
units for the time being. These measures are intended to create a “normalized UAS 
culture” throughout the organization (USAF, 2009). The Air Force has realized the need 
to embrace UAS as an inevitable and beneficial part of its future, and thus ease the 
burden of large-scale organizational change.   
In addition to training, doctrine, and personnel changes, UVS continue to 
consume a larger piece of each service’s budget with every passing fiscal year. It can be 
argued that the DoD in particular is an organization driven by budgeting of ever-
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increasing scarcity of funds. The fact that the DoD roadmap, as well as subordinate 
service strategy documents, calls for increasing investment of precious dollars in research 
and development—as well as procurement of unmanned systems—implies change in 
organizational priorities and thinking. 
B. FROM UNMANNED TO AUTONOMOUS  
UVS have provided a means of removing human operators from direct contact 
with potentially dangerous situations within the battlespace. As established, these systems 
are conducting single-mission tasks traditionally performed by military personnel. They 
remain however, remotely supervised and directly controlled by humans, using existing 
communication architectures and data links. In a presentation on Mission Focused 
Autonomous Control in June 2009, Dr. Bobby Junker of the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) stated that one of the primary factors driving systems development in this field is 
the desire to effectively automate information analysis and interpretation, as it is a 
manpower-intensive activity. Limited over-the-horizon (OTH) and LOS tactical 
communications, as well as the need for unmanned systems to perform multiple mission 
tasks in dynamic battlespace environments, are among other factors.  
In general terms, autonomy is defined as “the quality or state of being self-
governing” (autonomy, n.d.). Within the realm of unmanned systems, however, a more 
specific definiton is necessry. At the 2003 Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems 
Workshop, Huang, Messina, and Albus defined unmanned systems autonomy as “its own 
capability to achive its mission goals” (Huang, Messina & Albus, 2003). They further 
stated that the more complex the mission goals are, the higher the level of autonomy 
required, and that levels of autonomy are proportional to the system’s capability to 
percieve, plan, decide, and then act.  
An AVS can also be separated into the physical vehicle itself, be it an air, ground, 
or maritime variant, and the associated sensor hardware and computer software the 
vehicle relies on to conduct its mission(s). Depending on that mission, combinations of 
Global Posistioning System (GPS), Electro-Optic Infrared (EOIR), Milimeter Wave 
(MMW), and Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) are examples that make up the 
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“sesnsor package” that the vehicle uses to establish its postion, navigate itself and 
identify its mission objectives. This sensor package is integrated with computer 
processing hardware and software, as well as communications equipment for relay of 
information or possibly coordination with other vehicles/units. The vehicle itself is 
merely a transport mechanism for the autonomous sensor package, placing the sensor in 
the most ideal position within the battlespace for mission accomplishment. The 
integration of the sensor package with the physical vehicle is what makes an autonomous 
system a potential force multiplier.   
1. Current State of Autonomous Systems Within DoD   
The Air Force Unmanned Flight Plan outlines the necessary requirements, 
capabilities, and enabling technologies of current and future UAS within the context of 
DOTMLPF synchronization to achieve desired future levels of autonomy (USAF, 2009). 
It is the intent of the Air Force to incorporate UAS autonomy in the near-term where it 
increases the overall effectiveness of the platform and where it best supports the 
warfighter and/or decision maker. Ongoing efforts at the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) 
and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) are comprised of GPS-based autonomous 
navigation to achieve automated in-transit flight as well as automated launch and 
recovery.  Employment testing is being conducted using existing UAS platforms such as 
the RQ-11 Raven and the MQ-1 Predator, among others.  
Research into utilizing small- to medium-sized UAS in a swarm configuration is 
also ongoing. The concept of swarming calls for a group of several semi-autonomous 
aircraft connected to each other by a wireless ad-hoc network. The swarm would be 
monitored by a single human operator and be employed in direct support of both manned 
and unmanned units, conducting imagery and sensor analysis, threat identification, and 
persistent ISR of the battlespace (USAF, 2009). Individual aircraft within the swarm 
would also have the ability to conduct airspace management and obstacle aviodance with 
one another. Future autonomous capabilities include air-refueling, airlift, and stratigic 
strike.  
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Autonomous ground vehicle development is focused in the areas of navigation, 
obstacle avoidance, and “sense making” within challenging terrain as well as urban 
environments. For example, in 2007, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) hosted a competition called Urban Challenge, which brought together teams 
from industry and academia in an experimental setting. The teams were required to 
modify existing vehicles to negotiate various forms of complex urban traffic conditions. 
For the first time, autonomous vehicles successfully interacted with both manned and 
other unmanned vehicle traffic for a duration of approximately four hours (DARPA 
Urban Challenge, 2007). Each team’s vehicle received an initial uploaded “mission 
definition/route file” five minutes prior to beginning the event, and this action constituted 
the extent of human interaction.  
As part of Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR SSC) Pacific’s 
ongoing Urban Exploration Project, advanced autonomous behaviors for navigation, 
mapping and exploration are being tested on small UVGs within complex, multi-building 
urban test bed environments. The first round of experimentation, completed in 2008, 
focused on assessing the vehicle’s ability to calculate position without the use of GPS, 
and to map the inside of structures with high degrees of clutter and obstruction. Utilizing 
the Autonomous Capabilities Suite (ACS), a modular software architecture integrating 
specific autonomous behaviors and perceptions with associated onboard sensor devices, 
SSC’s small UGV was able to effectively map, and navigate through, the interior of a 
one-story building. The vehicle used laser scan matching and video data to build a map of 
its surroundings and reference its own position within that map with minimal input and 
correction from the operator.  
Current ONR USV efforts are focused on delivering perception-based navigation 
and maneuvering, on-board health monitoring, and mission level autonomy (Office of 
Naval Research, 2008). ONR also is developing “clean sheet” USV designs vice 
modifying existing manned craft. Numerous USVs have demonstrated the ability to 
conduct autonomous GPS waypoint navigation, and current testing is concentrated on 
autonomous path planning to achieve dynamic obstacle avoidance of both fixed and 
mobile contacts as well as terrain features. These vehicles use many of the same sensor  
devices that can be found on other UVS such as on board chart libraries, RADAR and 
GPS inputs, and EO/IR imagery. Figure 2 depicts the USV design under development by 
ONR.  
 
Figure 2.   ONR USV (From Office of Naval Research, 2008) 
2. Capability Challenges and Limitations  
It is important to note that the concept of “auto-pilot” has been around for 
decades, and is relatively easy to achieve. Simply recording current heading and position 
data, a vehicle’s computer can then mechanically direct its control mechanisms, such as 
rudders and propulsion, through the use of actuators. Likewise, current guided munitions 
utilize fire and forget technology to “autonomously” guide themselves to their targets. 
These environments are relatively static. What separates “auto-pilot” from intelligent 
autonomous systems is their ability to make sense of and react within dynamic operating 
environments given what they “see,” and take effective actions to accomplish mission 
tasks and goals without the need for direct human supervision.  
Some of the limitations and challenges associated with current AVS are common 
regardless of operating domain. As previously mentioned, much research is currently 
underway in the field of obstacle avoidance and optimum path navigation. Driving by 
GPS waypoints can be relatively easy, but accomplishing this while simultaneously 
taking into account trees, buildings, wind speed, altitude, water depth, current, sea state, 
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and other moving vehicles is somewhat more complicated. Successfully negotiating these 
conditions while en-route, or while conducting mission tasks and goals, poses a 
significant challenge to current systems. A human will see and anticipate the effects of 
sea state conditions on his craft, and take action accordingly. Thus far, a computer cannot 
accomplish these tasks with a high degree of reliability.  
Another limitation associated with current AVS relates to contextual decision 
making and Situational Awareness (SA) (Finn and Scheding, 2010). Key components of 
good decision making are an accurate perception, comprehension, and projection of the 
operating environment, which together make up SA (Finn and Scheding, 2010). 
Unmanned and semi-autonomous systems still rely a great deal on supervisor and 
operator injection based on sensor data collected. As of yet, AVS are unable to 
distinguish uniqueness and complexity with regard to their environment; indeed, they are 
not aware of what their environment is. A computer makes logical decisions based on its 
programming and, unfortunately, the modern battlespace does not always afford the 
decision maker logical or even rational choices. This limitation implies a lack of 
reliability, adaptability, and agility within the operating environment.  
This challenge is further compounded when we take into account the problem of 
human-autonomous system interaction and collaboration. As of now, humans still interact 
with semi-autonomous systems in a direct supervisor and guidance role. Much research is 
currently underway in this area, ONR’s Human-Unmanned Systems Integration and 
Perception, Understanding, and Intelligent Decision Making initiatives being examples. 
According to ONR, autonomous systems are meant to be an extension of, and 
collaborator to, the warfighter. Until these systems can share information and SA, as well 
as reliably complete mission tasks in such a way that is natural and beneficial to us, they 
will not achieve their intended role or earn the trust of their supervisors.  
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL   
The term Command and Control certainly has evolved since its inception 
more than 60 years ago. With each iterative addition of terms to the original C2 (C3, 
C4I, C4ISR, etc.), the concept of command and control in modern military 
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operations has come to encompass a great deal. In its broadest sense, however, the 
DoD currently defines C2 in Joint Publication 1-02 as: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and 
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment 
of the mission. Also called C2. (Department of Defense, 2001) 
C2, however, is no longer tied to one single commander at the top of an 
organization; rather, it is distributed responsibility in modern warfare (Alberts & Hayes, 
2003). Therefore, C2 can now also be understood to mean the fusing of technologies, 
resources, and information with operators and decision makers at all levels of an 
organization, with the goal of task and mission accomplishment. C2 are functions that 
need to be accomplished for mission success, and are therefore argued to be about 
providing the necessary and suficient conditions for that success, and not necessarily how 
these functions are performed (Alberts & Hayes, 2003).  
The conditions for success could be many things, but inherent to them is robust 
experience, information, and communication flow, shared SA, and task allocation 
throughout the organization that contributes to decision superirority. Again, the effective 
use and employment of an organization’s assets (both technological and human) is a 
critical aspect of C2.   
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III. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS  
A. FEATURES AND COMPONENTS OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
In defining AVS for the purposes of this thesis, the physical vehicle as well as the 
controlling computer software, decision algorithms, and sensor packages are identified as 
major components that allow the system to conduct its assigned mission. A robust 
systems engineering and integration process is required when developing an autonomous 
system and to be sure, many of the components and sub-components are dependent on 
vehicle mission and operating domain. There are, however, several necessary features 
and components common in all modern autonomous systems.  
In their recent work on AVS, Finn and Scheding (2010) discussed the key 
functional components in terms of their inter-dependence and integration to form the 
overall system. The authors identified components of any autonomous system to be 
combinations of sensor packages, navigation hardware and software, communications 
equipment, as well as varying levels of human interaction. These components allow for 
other features and behaviors of the system, and when further coupled with platform 
specific design and payloads, allow for mission execution. The complete functional 
relationship diagram is depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Key functional relationships for an autonomous UVS  
(From Finn & Scheding, 2010) 
 15
 16
The mission payload component is usually composed of sensor packages in many 
configurations, depending on platform and operating domain. They essentially allow the 
system to “know” its position and movement relative to some reference, and to perceive 
mission relevant data necessary for task completion. A few major examples of sensor 
sub-components include GPS, magnetic compasses, EO/IR cameras, and Radio Detection 
and Ranging (RADAR). The sensor packages, and the associated behavior they facilitate, 
are critical to the overall effectiveness of the system in the performance of its mission.  
Also common to all systems is some form of communications capability, which 
allows for collaboration and interaction with human supervisors and/or other unmanned 
systems. These communication components usually take the form of LOS (HF, UHF, and 
VLF), satellite communications (SATCOM) data links, or some combination of the two. 
The communications component present on the vehicle, and on any other vehicles or 
supervising entities, form the architecture for achievement of shared SA.  
Of equal importance to the AVS is the human interaction component. These 
systems, even if operating at varying levels of autonomy, will always require human 
input from design inception through employment. Thus, the human interaction piece 
takes many forms including programmers, engineers, and users/supervisors that design 
and operate the system (Finn & Scheding, 2010). These systems, to the extent allowed by 
technology, must be programmed and designed through the use of complex software and 
algorithms with some understanding of mission goals as well as the outcomes for the 
actions it performs. Moreover, the functional Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) must 
assist the supervisors in understanding what the system is doing, what actions it is taking, 
and any relevent uncertainty encountered (Finn & Scheding, 2010).  
Another critical component of any AVS is its ability to effectively navigate within 
the operating environment. This feature, like many present in the system, relies heavily 
on the inputs, and resulting actions, from other components. By taking input from 
localization and perception components, the system processes data and is able to build a 
map of its environment and determine how to navigate within that environment, while 
detecting and avoiding obstacles that would impact mobility (Finn & Scheding, 2010). 
From this, the system directs controlling actions and behaviors to execute a mission.   
These four core components of the AVS (mission payload, communications, 
human interaction, and navigation) are connected in a continuous cycle, both depending 
on and facilitating one another. They allow for the other functions such as system 
response, behavior, perception and planning. Once integrated with onboard computer 
processing power, software, and algorithms, the completed component cycle is what 
drives system autonomoy and mission/task accomplishment. The core component cycle is 
depicted in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   AVS component-mission relationship cycle 
From the previously referenced functional component diagrams, sub-components 
and the capabilities they deliver to the system can be further itentified. It is these 
capabilities that also contriute to system autonomy and allow for the execution of mission 
tasks. The derived sub-components and capabilies are depicted in Table 1. While the list 
of sub-components is not exhaustive, it does cover many of the more common items in 
use with modern AVS. The capailities delived by these sub-components are, of course, at 
varoius levels of system maturity based on technology development. When taken together 
they represent the same necessary processing, integration, and understanding of 
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information required of warfighters in complex military environments. The trend toward 
system autonomy is also a trend toward the level of artificial intelligence required to 
operate at or near the level of humans. Moreover, these capabilities are critical for future 
AVS acting as peers and effective force multipliers.  
Table 1.   Component capability table 
Component Capability Table 
Component Sub-Components Capailities 
Navigation 
 GPS Waypoint  
 Terrain Mapping 
 Dead Reckoning  
 Mobility  
 Obtacle Aviodance  
 Path Planning  
Internal Sensors 
 Pressure Sensors  
 Velocity Sensors  
 Health and Usage Monitoring 
(HUMS) 
 Localization  
 Self Diagnosis  
External Sensors 
 Intertial Measurement Unit 
 Magnetic Compass 
 GPS 
 Localization  
Environmental Sensors 




 Laser Rangefinder 
 Laser Designator  
 Moving Target Indicator  
 Perception 
 Sense-making  
 Situational Awareness 
 Task Planning  




 LOS (HF/UHF/VLF) 
 Collaberation 
 Information Sharing 
Computing Power 
 System Software  
 Processing Power  
 Decision/Logic Algorithms  
 Control  
 Data Integration/Fusion 
 Decision Making  
Payloads 
 Sensor Pakages  
 Mission Specific Components 
 Task/Mission Completion  
 
Future advances in autonomous capability can be directly linked to advances in 
computer processing power, which is a function of speed and memory. The computing 
power, which includes associated software and algorithms, are essential for all 
components of the overall system. Using an extrapolation of Moore’s Law, which states 
that computer processing speed doubles approximately every 18 months, Nick Bostrom 
published a study in 1998 that equated computer processing power to that of the human 
brain. From this, he was able to estimate roughly when computers could achieve human 
equivalence. The human brain contains about 1011 neurons, with each neuron containing 
about 5000 synapses, and with signals transmitting along those synapses at about 100Hz. 
Estimating that each signal contains 5 bits, this equates to 1017 operations per second, or 
1011 millions of instructions per second (MIPS), for human brain performance (Bostrom, 
1998). 
In a similar study, Moravec concluded that the human brain was capable of 108 
MIPS, based on his analysis of human retina processing and computer vision techniques. 
As far as memory capacity, the ratio of memory to speed has remained relatively constant 
over the course of computing history, giving that 1 byte/ops. Therefore, the human 
brain’s memory capacity is approximately 108 Mbytes (Moravec, 1998). The relationship 
between processor speed and memory is presented in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.   Relationship of processor speed and memory (From OSD, 2007) 
Both studies took into account processing speeds available at that time, as well as 
physical limitations of micro-processor technology and the cost trends for manufacturing 
high performance processors. Assuming that the physical limitaions could be overcome 
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and the costs associated with manufacture decrease over time, estimates based off 
Moore’s Law put realistic, affordable computer processing power equal to that of humans 
somewhere in the 2020–2025 timeframe (Bostrom, 1998; Moravec, 1998).  
B. FUTURE AUTONOMOUS CAPABILITY  
In order to derive the possible operational, organizational, and C2 implications of 
future autonomous systems within the maritime domain, it is necessary to first develop a 
set of expected near term (within the next decade), capabilities of those systems. Based 
upon current applied R&D efforts, expected advances in sensor and computing 
technology as well as ever-increasing budgetary investment and organizational 
commitment, it can be reasonably assumed that autonomous systems will become 
considerably more capable and reliable in a few specific areas. This increase in capability 
and reliability will allow these systems to conduct an expanded set of operational naval 
missions in support of the warfighter.   
The DoD envisions a force of future UVS that support and enhance the ability of 
the warfighter to conduct a wide range of missions within the battlespace more 
effectively and with less risk (OSD, 2009). Autonomy is viewed as a key capability of 
these systems to deliver minimized manning and bandwidth requirements while 
“extending the tactical range of operations beyond the LOS” (OSD, 2007). Cooperative 
Autonomoy also allows for these systems to operate in an integrated, collaborative 
manner with other UVS as well as manned assets for mission accomplishment in 
dynamic environments, and across multiple Joint Capability Areas (JCA). Developing the 
associated technologies that will enable complementary collaberation is of paramount 
importance to the organization, and is the focus of several current R&D efforts.  
It is the goal of the DoD to invest in future technologies and system solutions that 
can be applied across multiple operating domains and JCAs in keeping with the JCIDS 
process. Within the realm of unmanned and autonomous systems, there are certain key 
technology areas that are common to the advancing of capability in all three operating 
domains, while other technology investments and development will need to be domain 
specific. Advances in autonomous related technology will be an incremental process, 
requiring sustained commitment from all parties involved in the R&D efforts. An 
analysis of DoD strategy documents and master plans allows for assessment and 
estimation of when these key technology solutions are expected to be available to the 
warfighter in the form of system capabilities. Figure 6 depicts a few major technology 
areas common to all operating domains, where targeted R&D efforts are underway.  
 
Figure 6.   Technology enablers common to all domains (From OSD, 2009) 
Technologies such as human robot interaction, human detection, and advanced 
autonomous navigation and obstacle avoidance are identified as critical for success in 
future systems employment, regardless of operating domain. For example, developing 
technology solutions that enable the system to act as more of a partner and collaborator 
with the warfighter are in keeping with the Department’s vision for future autonomous 
systems. Much of this capability depends on further development and integration of 
onboard sensor systems that contribute to overall awareness.  
Likewise, the ability of the system to detect and classify humans from other 
contacts within the environment will contribute greatly to system awareness and task 
completion. Supporting emerging technologies include human skin detection, LIDAR, 
microwave, and visual sensors that are currently being developed by multiple agencies 
within DoD and industry. These technologies and the capability they bring are expected 
to be available to the warfighter by the end of this decade (OSD, 2009).  
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1. Maritime Domain Specific Future Capabilities  
As part of the SPAWAR SSC San Diego USV project, technologies enabling 
dynamic obstacle avoidance and path planning are being tested. The obstacle avoidance 
capability has two components operating simultaneously: a reactive, or near field, and a 
deliberative, or far field (Nguyen et al., 2009). The deliberative component continuously 
modifies the existing route of the vehicle to plan around both fixed and mobile obstacles, 
whereas the reactive piece avoids obstacles in close proximity to the vehicle. This 
obstacle avoidance capability is accomplished through the integration of sensors 
including marine RADAR, Automatic Identification System (AIS), monocular vision, 
and LIDAR. Nautical charts are also used and programming takes into account the 
maritime rules of the road, though this is still somewhat limited. As the obstacle 
avoidance capability continues to mature, reliable autonomous navigation within the 
complex maritime environment is likely within reach.  
Additionally, the Autonomous Payload Deployment System (APDS) project aims 
to enable a vehicle platform to autonomously deliver a variety of mission payloads, 
including stand-alone sensors, IR illuminators, communications relays, or ammunition 
within the battlespace. An onboard deployment module can deliver a payload based on 
pre-programmed response to environmental conditions or by remote control (Nguyen et 
al., 2009). Experimentation and testing is currently limited to UGVs in use at SPAWAR 
SSC Pacific for EOD missions; however, potential application in the surface and 
underwater domains is likely as the associated technology continues to advance. The 
capability of a vehicle to autonomously detect, react, and respond to its environment by 
delivering mission- or task-specific payloads crosses the threshold between systems that 
are passive and those that become more interactive in their operational employment.  
In the area of human robot interaction, the Program Executive Office for Littoral 
and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) is developing the Unmanned Systems Common Control 
(USCC) software integration architecture for use with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
and its initial mission package modules. Those Phase 0 mission packages include Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Surface Warfare 
(SUW). The USCC is intended to provide a “strategy and open business approach to 
ensuring that control of unmanned maritime systems is common across vehicles and 
across missions” (PEO LMW, 2009). The software system resides on the LCS Mission 
Package Computing Environment host hardware, and provides standard interfaces and 
common applications for unmanned vehicle control across mission packages. In addition 
to integration with mission packages and individual unmanned vehicles, USCC also 
provides interfaces to the LCS specific Combat Management System (PEO LMW, 2009). 
A high-level veiw of the USCC and its relationship to other ships’ systems is shown in 
Figure 7. The USCC functional components include Navigation Control, Mission 
Planning, Recorder Management, Common Mission Control, and Unmanned Vehicle 
Interface. Together, these componenets contribute to collaberation, coordination, 
supervison and control of assets in the execution of a mission.  
 
Figure 7.   Top-level view of USCC in LCS context (From PEO LMW, 2009) 
While currently limited in development and testing to the LCS and its current 
mission packages, the USCC architecture has envisioned future applications for emerging 
unmanned and autonomous systems as well as other host platforms. Long-term 
standardization and commonality of hardware and software components will contribute to 
future interoperability across missions and operating domains (PEO LMW, 2009). USCC 
represents a concentrated effort by the Navy to further standardize and integrate the 
various vehicle systems, regardless of mission, to existing manned assets. This focus on 
delivering advanced and robust human machine interaction capability to the warfighter 
will allow the service to better leverage the emerging unmanned and autonomous systems 
entering the fleet.  
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C. NAVAL TACTICAL TASK LIST (NTTL)  
The NTTL is a sub-component of the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) and is 
meant to provide a comprehensive hierarchical listing of the mission related tasks that 
can be expected to be performed by naval forces (DON, 2008). The NTTL also identifies 
variables within an operating environment that may affect performance of a given task, as 
well as assigns generic measures of effectiveness (MOE) that a commander can then 
tailor to establish a detailed standard baseline of performance for his or her unit. As stated 
by instruction, the NTTL only defines what operational tasks are expected to be 
performed, and not who will perform them or how (DON, 2008). These details are left to 
service specific doctrine, CONOPS, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP).  
Ultimately, the NTTL uses a common language and provides a framework for 
further development of Navy Mission Essential Task Lists (NMETLs) by a commander. 
NMETLs provide a “command specific listing of critical tasks, conditions, and standards 
required to perform a command’s mission” (Brown, 2007). NMETLs are primarily used 
for unit training and evaluation as well readienss reporting as a part of the larger Navy 
Warfare Training System. A commander can and will select many tasks from the NTTL 
that pertain to the accomplishment of his or her assigned mission for specific tailoring 
into NMETLs. For the purpose of this analysis, selected maritime operational threads will 
be taken from, and limited to, the NTTL based on the likely impact of future autonomous 
capabilities in the near term.  
1. Mine Countermeasure Operations  
Given the previously identified expected near-term advances in AVS technology 
and capability, the Mine Warfare (MIW) community stands to be affected greatly by the 
increased introduction of autonomous systems over the next 10 years. To be sure, current 
field experimentation and testing have shown success in the use of tele-operated UUVs 
for detection and identification of mine-like contacts (MILC). Fleet MCM surface units 
are aging and the trend would seem to imply that the Navy has acknowledged a major 
shift in the structuring of the MIW field. The requirements for MCM operations revolve 
around the need to establish and maintain safe fleet operating areas and transit routes 
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(Q-routes) for Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Readiness Groups 
operating both in the open ocean and in the littorals (NUWC, 2004). MCM and its 
component mission types focus on determining the presence or absence of mines in a 
given area (mine hunting) as well as neutralization of the mine threat.  
The NTTL describes MCM operations under the broad task of maintaining 
mobility of naval forces, a subcomponent of Naval Task (NTA) 1: Deploy/Conduct 
Maneuver.  Subordinate of maintaining mobility are the several MCM related sub-tasks, 
which are summarized in Table 2. The central process in MCM is the ability to reliably 
detect, identify, classify, mark, and then neutralize mines. This process is accomplished 
through the use of multiple platforms, currently both manned and unmanned, and through 
a variety of sensors. The critical constraints to this process are time and space; the time 
required to complete mine hunting and neutralization, and the total area searched and 
then cleared.  
The MOE associated with MCM related NTAs generally exemplify the central 
process and constraints identified above. Ultimately, MCM is conducted to mitigate risk 
(probability of damage) to friendly forces/ships. This probability of damage is defined as 
the expected value of the probability of damage to ships/units given a certain number of 
mines remaining in the operations area at the completion of MCM efforts (Cramer et al., 
2009). The other MOE specifically address the issues of time required to complete 
marking and clearing of mines, total area searched and cleared, and percent accuracy of 
MILC properly identified and classified. 
The current version of the Fleet Unmanned Undersea System CONOPS goes into 
great detail about the nature of UUV development and operation in current as well as 
future mission roles. With regard to MCM operations, the CONOPS envisions future 
teams of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) operating in concert with one another 
as well as with manned assets to reduce timelines required for search, identification, and 
classification of mines within a given area of operations (AO) (DoN, 2010). Currently, 
UUVs collect data pertaining to the area of interest (minefield) and then are recovered by 
manned assets for data analysis and interpretation. The benefit of utilizing teams of 
advanced AUV for MCM is that by coordinating and leveraging the information each 
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vehicle collects in real-time, the interpretation and analysis of the threat (presence of 
mines) can occur in a timelier, more reliable manner with minimal danger to humans.   
Table 2.   MCM-related Navy tasks 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) NTA Description 
Units Measures 
Percent Residual risk to friendly forces 
Hours  To complete clearing of mines 
1.3.1 Perform Mine 
Countermeasures  
To detect, identify, classify, mark, 
avoid, neutralize, and disable (or 
verify destruction of) and exploit 
mines using a variety of methods 
including air, surface, and subsurface 
assets.  
Nautical 
Miles  Cleared operations area 
    
Nautical 
Miles Area searched 
Hours  To complete marking of mine field  
1.3.1.1 Conduct 
Mine Hunting  
To detect, locate, and mark mines that 
present a hazard to force mobility in 
an overt, covert, and/or clandestine 
manner. The employment of sensor 
systems (including air, surface, and 
subsurface assets) to locate and 
dispose of individual mines. Mine 
hunting is conducted to determine the 
presence or absence of mines in a 
given area. 
Number  Mine-like objects found




To reacquire a MILC using one or 
more of several search techniques, to 
include all surface, air, and underwater 
techniques.   
Percent Of all mine-like contacts reacquired  
    
Percent  Accuracy of objects identified  1.3.1.1.2 Identify 
Mine-like Contacts 
(MILC) 
To identify a MILC through various 
observation techniques (i.e., divers’ 
eyes-on, remotely operated vehicle 
(ROV) pictures, and live or recorded 
video) as either a mine or non-mine.  
Percent  Of objects Identified  
 
a. Cumulative Detection Probability 
An applicable platform level performance metric for future teams of AUV 
conducting MCM is Cumulative Detection Probability (CDP), which is a function of 
sensor performance, time on station, and coverage factor (total search area) (Tutton, 
2003).  Detection is the critical first step in MCM operations and therefore the ability of 
an AUV to first accurately detect a MILC and also build a map of its surroundings 
becomes necessary for all other aspects of the MCM mission. Presumably a team of 
AUV, if able to share localization and contact data in real-time, would be able to build a 
collaborative map of the AO. This would undoubtedly contribute to increased CDP, 
ensuring most, if not all, MILC are accounted for within a defined AO.  
Revisiting a 2003 study provides an example analysis with appropriate 
definitions and equations necessary to calculate CDP. Tutton defined platform level 
sensor performance in terms of adjusted sweep width and sensing velocity. Adjusted 
sweep width takes into account the likelihood of multiple sensors mounted on the same 
platform, then selects the sensor with the maximum sweep width and applies a 
dependence factor to the remaining cumulative sum of the other sensor sweep widths 
( sw ). This dependence factor ( ) is applied to account for the added benefits of multiple 
sensors on the same platform. The resulting equation, as derived by Tutton, is:  
 ( ) *{ ( ) ( )}adj s s sW MAX w w MAX w    (1) 
The assumptions associated with calculating adjusted sweep width include 
optimum sensor package combination for the assigned mission, and that the platform 
operates at optimum range for the sensors associated with it and the target type of interest 
(Tutton, 2003).  
In order to calculate time on station, it is necessary to factor in transit 
speed of the platform to and from the search area, sensing velocity, and total operational 
time for the platform, i.e., the total amount of time the platform can remain operational 
while transiting and searching. Time on station is thus determined by:   




   (2) 
( ) is the total operational time, ( ) is the distance to the search area, and ( ) is the 
transit speed of the platform.  
opT D tV
The third factor in calculating CDP as defined by Tutton is the coverage 
factor, or total search area covered. Coverage factor is determined by assuming a fixed 
AO (minefield), and taking into account sensing velocity, time on station, and adjusted 
sweep width (Tutton). The resulting equation is:  
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 Coverage Factor
s adjv W t
A
  (3) 
This coverage factor is the ratio of search area swept by the platform, where ( sv ) is the 
sensing velocity, ( t ) is the time on station, and ( A ) is the total AO. From these 
calculations, CDP can be calculated for multiple platforms of the same type ( p ) by 









   (4) 
After a brief example that included reasonable values for the associated variables defined 
above, and taking into account the assumptions related to each calculation, Tutton was 
able to graphically depict a CDP curve showing a positive correlation between number of 
platforms and CDP. The CDP curve is presented in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8.   Cumulative Detection Probability (CDP) curve (From Tutton, 2003) 
The preceding performance metric example is scalable and meant to 
illustrate the benefit of utilizing multiple, collaborative sensor platforms in the 
execution of a particular mission. Based on emerging AUV payload capabilities, as 
well as advances in navigation, localization and 3D mapping, the other components 
of the MCM process, i.e., identification, classification, and marking of MILC, are 
likely to become increasingly automated in the near term. This trend implies major 
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tactical as well as operational implications for the future of MIW and will require 
shifts in organizational design and thinking.  
2. Maritime ISR 
In its broadest sense, ISR is concerned with the synchronization and integration of 
sensors, assets, processing techniques, and dissemination systems to support current and 
future military operations (Department of Defense, 2001). It is the fusion of several 
intelligence and operations fucntions to form an integrated support discipline for the 
requirements of the warfighter. The production of intelligence is a result of the collection, 
processing, analysis, and dissemination of raw data into valuable information that can 
then be used for decision making and mission execution. The concept of ISR takes this 
process a step further and adds the requirement for shared understanding and battlespace 
awareness across multiple operating domains.  
Maritime ISR requirements span all three domains of naval operations; surface, 
sub-surface, and air. In order to achieve shared understanding and SA, platforms and 
assets need to be networked and integrated to produce reliable information about the 
operating environment, thereby supporting the Navy’s FORCEnet operational construct. 
A major requirement associated with maritime ISR is the need for long-dwell, persistent 
platforms capable of acting as communications relay nodes and sources of information 
for operational naval commanders. Furthermore, the information produced as a result of 
maritime ISR efforts needs to be fully integrated into the Maritime Operations Center 
(MOC) C2 architecture as well as the larger Global Information Grid (GIG) (DON, 
2008). 
The NTTL addresses several ISR related tasks under the umbrella of NTA 2: 
Develop Intelligence. The sub-tasks identified in Table 3 represent a few of the 
component activities necessary to develop Intelligence Preparation of the Operating 
Environment (IPOE); namely surveillance, reconnaissance, and collection of data 
associated with an AO. The data associated with an AO includes anything from 
geographic features to location and disposition of enemy targets as well as friendly 
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forces. MOE associated with these tasks are concerned with evaluating the time required 
to position, or re-position, assets in place and percent of all collection requirements 
fulfilled.    
Table 3.   ISR-related Navy tasks 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) NTA Description 
Units Measures 
Days  From receipt of tasking, information available  
Percent  
Of collection 
requirements fulfilled by 
recon/surveillance assets 2.2.1 Collect Target 
Information  
To acquire information that supports 
the detection, identification, location, 
and operational profile of enemy targets 
in sufficient detail to permit attack by 
friendly weapons. Activities include 
searching for, detecting, and locating 
targets; and then tracking to include 
information such as range, bearing, 
altitude/depth, latitude/longitude, grid, 
and course and speed of the target.  
Percent  
Of time able to respond 
to collection 
requirements  
    
Days  
From receipt of tasking, 
unit reconnaissance and 




requirements fulfilled by 
reconnaissance and 





To obtain, by various detection 
methods, information about the 
activities of an enemy or potential 
enemy or tactical area of operations. 
This task uses surveillance to 
systematically observe the area of 
operations by visual, electronic, 
photographic, or other means. This 
includes development and execution of 
search plans.  Percent  
Of time able to respond 
to collection 
requirements  
    
Hours  
From receipt of tasking 
until search force is in 
place  
Hours  To respond to emergent tasking(s)  
2.2.3.1 Search 
Assigned Areas  
To conduct a search/localization plan 
utilizing ordered search modes/arcs  
Percent  




It is once again appropriate to recognize reliable detection as an indispensable 
enabling performance factor of any asset employed for ISR purposes. Without a high 
CDP, the follow-on functions identification, tracking, and overall battlespace awareness 
cannot be carried out. Achieving as high a CDP as possible requires not only versatile 
sensor equipment, but also optimum tasking and allocation of platforms within an AO so 
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that reduction in false-positive detection rate is possible. The environment in which 
maritime ISR assets operate (primarily air and surface) however, is significantly more 
cluttered than that of MCM platforms, so the problem of detection and differentiation is 
made exceedingly more complicated. Within the realm of ISR, it is of course not simply 
the detection and identification of MILC, but rather a whole range of possible small/large 
objects, contacts, targets, terrain features, weather affects, and indeed, humans. The 
complicated, and potentially hostile, operating environment with its numerous data 
collection requirements suggests a need for highly intelligent AVS.  
The utilization and incorporation of UVS, particularly within the air domain, for 
ISR-related tasking is evolving to the point of relative maturity, especially as the 
capabilities for increased persistence and rudimentary perception continue to improve. 
However, the data collected from these systems during the course of their tasking must 
still be transmitted, and then analyzed and interpreted by human supervisors/operators 
before any useful information about the AO can be produced. The time required to turn 
raw data into valuable information varies, depending on myriad intermediate technology 
and human cognitive processes. The desire to achieve automated data analysis and 
interpretation is a stated goal of future DoD AVSs and is the subject of several current 
R&D projects. Providing reliable and trusted information to the warfighter in as short a 
time as possible is in fact one of the component functions of intelligence operations. 
These AVSs will need to be capable of fusing data inputs from multiple onboard, as well 
as networked, sensors providing a variety of data pertaining to the AO.  
a. Situational Awareness 
Developing and maintaining good SA is arguably one of the most critical 
human cognitive factors associated with the successful execution of military operations, 
from the tactical through the strategic level. While many definitions of the term exist, 
they all tend to revolve around a central process; the perception of the elements of the 
environment, comprehension of their meaning, and projection of that understanding into 
the near future in order to take action (Endsley, 1995). Each component of this process 
equates to a corresponding level of SA according to Endsley. Naturally, as the  
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complexity associated with the environment increases, so too does the cognitive 
workload required to achieve and maintain SA in order to make informed decisions 
(Endsley, 1995).   
When developing SA, humans rely on inputs from all five of the senses to 
perceive environmental conditions that relate to the completion of mission goals and tasks. 
We have the ability to distinguish relevant from non-relevant and can adjust our sensory 
attention accordingly based on changes in our surroundings (Adams, 2007). Next, we 
achieve comprehension by integrating our perception of the environment as applied to our 
understanding of mission goals and experience from memory. Finally, from our perception 
and comprehension of the mission environment, we are able to predict what will occur in 
the near-term, which is typically a highly demanding cognitive activity and can be limited 
depending on workload, stress, and metal capacity (Adams, 2007).  
With regard to AVSs, current platforms are beginning to exhibit basic 
level environmental perception capability, from the integration of onboard sensors and 
computer processing power. As previously discussed in this chapter, that perception 
capability is both internal and external, e.g., navigation and localization related and 
mission task related. Advances in onboard sensor and computing technology will 
presumably allow for better contact and target detection, tracking, and identification, 
especially when integrated with other platforms and/or humans. The challenges for 
achieving machine SA are in the area of comprehension and prediction. Logic algorithms 
result in most systems being highly reactive to their environment, without a real 
comprehension of their overall mission goals. R&D in the areas of artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, and 3D world modeling applying highly complex mathematical models 
are addressing the challenges associated with simulating complex human cognition in 
future AVSs.  
A discussion of SA leads to an expansion of the concept of levels of 
autonomy present in the system. Numerous definitions and interpretations of autonomy 
levels exist, but generally system autonomy characteristics range from full human control 
of the vehicle (no autonomy) to complete removal of the human from all functions of the 
system (full autonomy). The common denominator is the degree of human interaction 
with the system in the course of its mission. Adams correlated levels of autonomy to 
levels of both system and human SA. Direct human control of the system, i.e., most 
current UVS, would equate to little, if any, machine SA, while fully autonomous systems 
would reduce considerably the level of human SA (Adams, 2007). Figure 9 provides a 
basic representation of the relationship between levels of system autonomy and levels of 
SA, for both the machine and the human.  
 
Figure 9.   An allocation of human and UMS SA across the levels of autonomy          
(From Adams, 2007) 
The preceding discussion of SA is meant to illustrate a necessary attribute 
that machines will need to possess when conducting maritime ISR. There are of course 
other attributes that will be critical such as threat recognition and avoidance, robust 
communications capability, and system signature management to name a few. However 
given the dynamic, data intensive nature of this mission set, future platforms will need to 
develop some level of overall SA in order to effectively act as reliable collaborators to 
their human counterparts and/or supervisors.  
Reduction in the cognitive workload required by humans when conducting 
data analysis and interpretation requires these systems to be capable of advanced, 
adaptive behaviors based on environmental conditions and mission goals. These mission 
goals translate to comprehension of intelligence collection requirements as well as the 
ability to process raw data into useful information. An obvious benefit of incorporating 
highly intelligent and persistent AVSs, with the capability for SA and simulated human 
cognition, into maritime ISR mission sets is the dramatic reduction in the time 
requirements associated with IPOE.  
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
A. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA) 
This thesis has documented examples of current UVS and AVS employment, 
explored expected future technology and capabilities, and has provided analysis of 
possible impact to maritime warfare areas. The continued growth in technology and 
capability of these systems, coupled with improved performance within the battlespace, 
suggest an impending RMA. As the human element is removed more and more from the 
tasks, processes, and decisions associated with military operations, the organization that 
those systems support will undoubtedly be required to undergo a transformation in order 
to best align its changing components.  
Throughout its history, technology innovation has contributed to several periods 
of transformation within the U.S. Military. This is argued to be especially true of the 
twentieth century, where the period between major military innovations decreased as a 
result of two world wars, a political and ideological Cold War, and vast changes in 
organizational commitment to R&D as well as performance measurement (Murray & 
Millet, 1996). Innovation is also driven by the desire to remain “a step ahead” of an 
adversary or potential adversary, as the organization recognizes the likelihood of equal 
employment of capability within the battlespace.  
The introduction of naval air power, coupled with the adoption of the aircraft 
carrier, provides an appropriate historical example to illustrate an RMA experienced by 
the U.S. Navy in the period between the two world wars, culminating with their full 
integration and relative maturity in the Pacific theater of World War II. Advances in 
aircraft design and performance capability during the 1920s and 1930s, as well as lessons 
learned from limited employment during the First World War, led to a transformation in 
the structure and operation of the U.S. Navy’s battle fleets. To be sure, this 
transformation did not occur overnight. It was resisted by many naval leaders of the time, 
and has been argued to be a function of necessity during the interwar period, given the 
next perceived strategic threat (Japan) and the geographic circumstances of the vast 
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Pacific where that threat would be met. This required a naval fleet capable of providing 
its own organic air cover far from land bases (Murray & Millet, 1996).   
This level of strategic thinking by leadership at the time highlighted the 
realization that naval air power could be employed for direct attack against enemy fleets 
and merchant targets, as well as for close air support for amphibious operations. 
Employment of maritime air power in such a manner would require further maturity of 
training, maintenance, and support structures already beginning to emerge within the 
organization. The immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor also no doubt contributed to the 
necessity of naval air power, as well as silenced any remaining critics as to the 
effectiveness of carrier-based aircraft. Thus, by the time the U.S. Navy was fighting 
Japan for sea control in the Pacific, the fleet was structured around carrier task forces able 
to project power via their embarked air wings. No longer was the battleship the 
centerpiece of warfare at sea, as opposing fleets would often fight one another without 
ever coming into direct contact.  
This example illustrates how the Navy was forced to integrate a new technology 
innovation into its existing organizational structure, ultimately causing a strategic shift in 
how maritime operations were conducted in order to best leverage the capability 
presented. The shift is of course fully realized today, in the form of a CSG centric fleet 
able to project power globally in support of the nation’s strategic objectives.  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE  
The type of large-scale change that usually results from an RMA cannot occur 
without first understanding the organization’s components, their relationships, and how 
they perform as a whole in the accomplishment of stated goals and missions. Gaining an 
appreciation of these complex aspects of organizational design, and how they impact one 
another, allows leadership to implement changes that best contribute to improved 
performance over time.  Research in the field of organizational and open systems theory 
has shown that any complex organization can be thought of as a system of inter-
connected social and technological factors working together for some common output. In 
general, this is accomplished by taking various input factors from the system’s 
environment, transforming them through some process or combination of processes, and 
then producing an output (Mercer Delta LLC, 1998). This process, complete with 
feedback provided by output to affect new input, is depicted in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.   The basic systems model (From Mercer Delta LLC, 1998) 
This model provides a basic representation for how any system, or for that matter 
organization, operates. To understand an organization’s performance however requires 
something more.  
1. The Congruence Model 
By looking at all of an organization’s components in terms of an inter-related 
system, the Mercer Delta Congruence Model is used to asses performance based on how 
the components “fit” or align together in the accomplishment of goals. Building upon the 
basic systems model, the Congruence Model identifies organizational inputs, components 
of the transformation process, and outputs in terms of what is produced and the 
performance at various levels of the organization. The model can also be used to help 
leadership gage the impact of minor or large-scale changes and how those changes will 
affect the concept of component congruence. As stated, the model “provides a very 
general roadmap or starting point on the path to fundamental organizational change” 
(Mercer Delta LLC, 1998). The Congruence Model is depicted in Figure 11.  
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Every organization is affected by factors relating to input, which the model 
defines as environment, resources, and history of the organization. Examples include 
other competing organizations, policies, new technologies, economic conditions, 
information, past strategic decisions, and organizational values. These input factors are 
considered “givens” by the model and exist largely external to the organization itself but 
define the demands, constraints, an opportunities present (Mercer Delta LLC, 1998).     
 
Figure 11.   Congruence Model (From Mercer Delta LLC, 1998) 
Central to the Congruence Model is the organizational transformational process, 
which is composed of the four key components of the organization; the work, the people 
who perform the work, the formal organization, and the informal organization. The work 
is the actual activities, tasks, and processes performed by the organization that are 
necessary to produce output and the people are responsible for execution of those 
processes. With regard to people, training, experience, and perception of their role in the 
overall organization must also be factored in. The formal organization refers to the 
“formal structures, processes and systems that enable individuals to perform tasks” 
(Mercer Delta LLC, 1998). These are usually well established and allow for further sub-
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organization and explicit guidance based on skills and capabilities to achieve strategic 
objectives. Finally, the informal organization component encompasses emerging 
processes, unwritten rules and practices, as well as other relationship dynamics that also 
contribute to individual behavior in the performance of their work. The informal 
organization can also be thought of as new and innovative business processes that can 
either compliment or conflict with more established, formal structures.  
Once again, by identifying and recognizing what the components of the 
organization are, as well as how they impact one another, a continual assessment of 
component congruence as related to organizational performance can occur. Likewise, 
managers can predict the likely impacts on the organization as a whole from 
implementation of change to one or more of its components.  
2. Impact of Machine Autonomy  
Emerging AVSs represent a significant disruption to the environment with which 
the U.S. Navy operates. As applied to the congruence model, these systems and the 
capabilities they are bringing to the battlespace—as discussed in this thesis—signify an 
external technological innovation that the organization will have to incorporate. When 
taken together with increasing overall organizational commitment to these systems in the 
form of funding and R&D, the introduction of advanced AVS as an external variable 
demands that the Navy adapt and fully integrate them into its organizational structures. 
Moreover, the realization that the U.S. is not the sole nation interested in this technology 
area requires us to remain ahead of our peers and competitors.  
Changes to the external environment can cause a ripple effect throughout the 
organization. This invariably leads to strategic level thinking and guidance about how the 
environment has changed or is changing, and how the organization will adapt to remain 
competitive. As this thesis has stated, the introduction of machine autonomy has 
produced organizational and warfare-area specific guidance and strategy for limited 
employment. The Navy is committed to the idea of fully networked, collaborative AVS 
that compliment and support traditional forces in the execution of their assigned 
missions. This goal can be thought of as the desired output for these systems, and can be 
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scaled across tactical or operational levels, and across multiple warfare areas. It is 
important to remember, however, that we are at the very beginning of what is realistically 
possible with these systems, and that our strategy will continue to evolve with time and 
experience. Recognizing what is possible now will allow for more detailed planning and 
guidance for the future.  
Possible problem areas for the organization as a result of this environmental 
change are in the areas of overall performance and potential for missed opportunity when 
attempting to re-align the organization. For example, without well-designed and 
beneficial HMI in place, assessment of mission objectives and task completion will be 
made more difficult and performance is likely to suffer. No matter what the degree of 
automation, a complementary relationship between the machine and the human must be 
ensured. Alternatively, a lack in understanding of capability, or a marginalizing of its 
worth, leading to organizational reluctance has the potential to degrade the effectiveness 
of AVS when employed. This problem would likely stem from a lack of experience and 
trust in the technology available.    
With regard to the Navy organization itself, all four core components (work, 
people, formal and informal organizations) can be analyzed based on congruence as a 
result of future AVS employment. The work performed encompasses the operational 
missions, NTAs, and core competencies that are expected of the organization as they 
support overall national and service strategies. They represent the reason that the Navy 
exists in the first place and the trend toward increasing machine automation of these 
activities will result in paradigm shifts across the organization. The introduction of future 
AVS as applied to the congruence model is depicted in Figure 12.  
Naval personnel, defense contractors, and academia partners directly execute, or 
support the execution of, our work as an organization. Personnel will, it seems, require 
new and dynamic skill sets, training methods, and research and acquisition objectives that 
can best take advantage of the new technologies afforded to them in the form of AVS 
capable of conducting tasks traditionally performed by humans.  
 
 Figure 12.   Congruence Model as applied to future AVS  
(After Mercer Delta LLC, 1998) 
The formal organization consists of how we are arranged by warfare areas and 
supporting organization structures complete with chains of command and C2 architectures. 
Also present are the myriad tactical, operational, and administrative doctrine for the 
conduct of assigned missions. This aspect of the organization is large, complex, and 
bureaucratic in nature and will therefore be the most difficult to incorporate change. From 
type commanders, system commands, and training commands to CSGs and individual units 
and aircraft, the formal organization is vast and provides the framework within which our 
people and assets conduct assigned work. The informal organization also exists in the form 
of overall service culture and the values, beliefs, and emerging processes they facilitate. 
Lessons learned, best practices, and personal experiences also significantly shape how our 
people and processes are coordinated for achievement of goals.  
In terms of component congruence, there is the potential for disconnect between the 
core components of the organization as they stand now, and the near-term introduction of 
intelligent AVS. Strategic guidance and R&D efforts aside, the formal organization may 
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not be ready for the kind of AVS employment that will be possible in the near future. Our 
command structures, especially at the operational level, are not well suited for mission 
relevant decisions and actions occurring at the speed of machine automation. The formal 
organization is of course made up of the people, who likewise may have problems 
maintaining situational awareness with their autonomous “assets” in carrying out their 
assigned work. It is for these reasons that the organization must attempt to shape or control 
the magnitude of the environmental impact from AVS. This is accomplished by the 
personnel and formal organizational components responsible for R&D and acquisition. 
They must continue to be provided with clear strategic guidance for what the organization 
as a whole wants in terms of performance output regarding AVS.  
Likewise, there must be seamless understanding of what is scientifically possible 
and what is operationally effective. If ungoverned in this manner, technology development 
could quickly advance past the point of maximum effectiveness for the overall 
organization. An example would be a compounding of a problem our personnel face today; 
data overload from sensor assets. If data analysis and processing within the battlespace are 
to be made more automated in the near future, how will our personnel keep up with the vast 
amounts of information produced and the decisions made by AVS as a result? Posed 
differently, if the technology and personnel are not aligned appropriately, performance will 
undoubtedly suffer. Formal processes like JCIDS and DOTMLPF analysis are meant better 
align the R&D and acquisition communities to the personnel and missions assigned. This is 
even more critical now as the nature of military operations appears to be changing 
dramatically via increased forms of automation and autonomy, which translates to 
increasing levels of machine authority to conduct military operations.  
The difficulties associated with integration of AVS into Naval forces and 
organizational structures are complex and extend well beyond the preceding analysis. 
However, the congruence model provides a necessary framework for understanding what 
makes the organization operate and how. Considering the near future, we pose three 
questions that guide and motivate our thinking. What if the organization can effectively 
re-align to leverage the enormous capability potential that will become available to it? 
What if AVS were true force multipliers contributing to superior operational 
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performance? In short, what if the desired organizational output, understood to mean 
collaborative human-machine warfighting capability, became reality? 
C. OPERATIONAL VIGNETTE   
The following example vignette is meant to help illustrate the type of 
collaborative behavior and performance capability that can be expected of future AVS in 
an operational setting. While brief, the example highlights how both manned and 
unmanned platforms, when integrated, can contribute to improved mission performance.  
The year is 2020 and the problem of maritime piracy remains a dangerous reality 
for the commercial shipping industry in the waters off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf 
of Aden. Coalition naval forces are committed to ensuring freedom of navigation and 
commerce on the high seas and possess a wealth of technology and experience in the 
conduct of anti-piracy operations. Information regarding a very recent coordinated pirate 
attack on a commercial bulk carrier transiting the Gulf of Aden is relayed to the theater 
MOC at Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) headquarters in Manama, 
Bahrain. While unsuccessful in their attempt to capture the vessel, the pirates inflicted 
moderate damage to the ship before making their escape.  
The MOC directs Commander, Coalition Task Force (CTF) 151 with locating and 
intercepting the pirates using any and all assets available. CTF 151 has at its disposal four 
surface combatants in the vicinity of the attack and two advanced airborne AVS capable 
of persistent ISR. Within hours of tasking, search and localization plans are formulated 
and executed based off appropriate time/speed/distance calculations and on estimation of 
the pirates last known heading. Data and information collected from each asset regarding 
the battlespace is networked resulting in an integrated and shared Common Operational 
Picture (COP) of the AO.  
Arriving on station soonest, and with an understanding the related mission 
parameters and objectives, the AVS assets are able to perform contact identification and 
classification while executing their assigned search patterns. Analyzed information 
regarding their surroundings is relayed into the network and the vehicles, working in 
conjunction with one another, begin building their own world models of the AO, to 
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include location and disposition of friendly assets assigned to the mission. The surface 
combatants, with embarked rotary-wing ISR capability, are able to monitor the progress 
of the search in real-time through common HMI software inherent to the network and 
present on all platforms, including the MOC ashore. As the surface combatants begin to 
arrive on station, shared SA of the environment is built via the collaboration of 
information already obtained, the understanding of mission goals, and the projection  
Approximately seven hours into the search, one of the AVS detects a potential 
contact of interest on the edge of its assigned search area, and immediately vectors itself 
closer to obtain required sensor data for positive classification. The information collected 
regarding the contact and the decision made by the vehicle to investigate further are fed 
into the network instantaneously. All other assets continue their assigned search patterns. 
Shortly thereafter, positive classification is made on the contact of interest by the AVS to 
include number of human occupants and presence of weapons onboard. This information 
is immediately confirmed by all manned assets within the AO to include the MOC. Based 
on pre-programmed knowledge of friendly platform performance capabilities and 
limitations, and calculations of distance, the vehicle recommends, via the network, 
vectoring of a manned surface combatant and helicopter asset from an adjacent search 
area. This recommendation is evaluated and accepted by both the manned asset in 
question and by the CTF and MOC commanders exercising C2 for the operation. The 
AVS remains in close contact with the suspect vessel until the vectored surface 
combatant arrives and conducts a boarding operation. Once this occurs the vehicle, with 
an understanding that this particular mission goal is complete, resumes its original search 
pattern. 
Meanwhile, the remaining mission participants, operating under the knowledge of 
three pirate vessels involved in the original attack, refine the boundaries of the AO based 
on all available information and redistribute accordingly to increase the probability of 
intercept. At just over twelve hours into the mission, one of the surface combatants comes 
into contact with two pirate vessels traveling together and launches a boarding operation 
of its own. With all suspected pirates in custody, both AVS return to their bases, and the 
surface combatants resume their original duties.  
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. IMPLICATIONS  
The observations and analysis presented in this thesis are meant to provide a 
framework for possible implications to maritime operations and organizational structure, 
as well as how certain aspects of C2 are impacted. The automation of military related 
operations will result in paradigm shifts for how we understand and conduct warfare. The 
preceding research has attempted to bracket what the operating environment might look 
like within the realm of what is realistically possible in the near-term. By doing this, 
major themes and characteristics related to the AVS were identified so that implications 
could be drawn about what they mean for the future of military operations.  
The speed and tempo of operations will likely increase dramatically in the coming 
decade. As autonomous systems capability continues to be employed in support of 
maritime missions and NTAs, the timeliness and availability of information will be 
enhanced greatly, ultimately contributing to increased speed of action within the 
battlespace. This is the reason that so many of our business processes are automated 
today, because doing so has proven to contribute to increased organizational efficiency. 
Now we stand on the forefront of automating our work as an organization, which is 
exceedingly more difficult to measure in terms of performance, and implies the necessity 
for fundamental organizational change.  
The speed and tempo of operations can be governed by the degree of decision 
authority granted to future AVSs. Invariably, as the technology and capability improves, 
the ability to make decisions and take action based on achieved perception and 
understanding will increase. This implies a merging, or compression, of the decision 
space between human and machine and naturally begs the question of how much of that 
space, or authority we relinquish. Similar to, or rather in conjunction with, machine 
versus human SA, there is a point at which the decision-making capability of both must 
be mutually beneficial. What is needed is an acceptable level of decision making 
authority granted to the system proportionate to mission goals, technical capability, and 
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demonstrated performance. Ultimately, the degree of decision making authority 
relinquished amounts to the degree of organizational acceptance (trust) in the system and 
the perceived impact on decision superiority within the battlespace.   
The Navy’s individual warfare area components will require clear definitions of 
the level of autonomy desired for future systems that it chooses to procure and field. 
Requirements and suitability for autonomy will differ from the MIW community to that 
of the Surface or Aviation communities for example due to the obvious differences in 
mission and the various processes used to accomplish that mission. This implies the need 
for an even closer, more cooperative relationship between the various system commands, 
its partners in industry and academia and across the entire defense acquisition 
organization. Likewise, it is critical that organizational guidance and CONOPS keep pace 
with emerging technology in the field of machine automation. A failure to accomplish 
this would result in poor organizational “fit” and degraded performance. Knowing how 
we expect the introduction of autonomy, to the extent realistically feasible, to benefit our 
processes, tasks, and structures is a first step toward realizing its potential.  
As this research previously stated in Chapter III, full machine automation has the 
potential to negatively impact human SA and thus would be detrimental to mission 
accomplishment in any context. There are certain military operations that probably would 
not, and should not, ever become fully automated in nature. Warfare is an activity innate 
to humans, and though we use technology to gain advantage over adversaries, technology 
itself cannot determine the conduct or outcome of war (Potts, 2002).   
The concept of “command” in the near term will become further decentralized 
and distributed as a result of the emerging technology discussed in this thesis. There is 
the potential for a blurring of the lines between operational and tactical command in the 
conduct of operations as a result of fully networked, collaborative AVS employment. For 
example, there can be no single person maintaining visibility of the information gathered 
and decisions made in the type of fast paced, high tempo operations that future 
technology will facilitate. This is acknowledged in current operating constructs such as 
FORCEnet and Network Centric Operations that suggest that the visibility is shared 
across all levels of the organization and warfighting environment simultaneously. How 
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does machine automation of complex military tasks impact these constructs? What if that 
visibility, and the SA that results from it, are achieved faster than can be beneficially 
shared? Put another way, what if the decisions resulting in action taken within the 
battlespace have already happened by the time humans realize something needs to be 
done? These questions are meant to emphasize the critical need for achieving proper 
organizational congruence as realized through clear definition of roles and desired 
outputs for these systems.    
Likewise the term “control” will continue to evolve in meaning. No longer will 
the exercise direct control over assigned forces be practicable. Even the nature of today’s 
dynamic warfighting environments is eroding at that obsolete definition. With the speed 
and availability of networked information for multiple independent actors (both manned 
and autonomous) operating together within the battlespace of the near future, the concept 
of control must be approached differently. Applying Alberts and Hayes’ concept of 
“establishing, to the extent possible, the initial conditions that will result in the desired 
behavior” appears relevant. With regard to emerging AVS, this concept should be taken 
to mean the proper alignment of the organization’s technological and social components 
for the purpose of leveraging capability. On a more tactical level, this means the 
arrangement and allocation of forces and assets within the battlespace and the 
communication of clear goals and understanding of commander’s intent.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future R&D will of course continue in the technology areas that facilitate 
machine autonomy. Advances in sensor integration, computing power, threat recognition 
and avoidance will result in systems that are adaptive and agile. When it comes to 
innovation the technical side, while certainly challenging, is only half of the overall issue. 
The magnitude of disruption to the organization as a result of technology represents the 
other half and still requires further analysis. Technology traditionally evolves rapidly 
while organizations tend to be much slower and more resistant to change.   
A great deal of time and resources are expended by the Navy, rightfully so, in the 
areas of training and performance evaluation. Whole sub-components of the organization 
 48
are dedicated to these activities as they provide the building blocks for operational 
success. Further research is needed to identify how our current training pipelines, 
manning requirements, and information systems will need to be reshaped to 
accommodate the technology innovation in the form of AVSs. Further study of the 
impact of autonomous systems on formal Navy mission sets, like Navy Tasks, should be 
conducted to identify the level of autonomy required for accomplishment of associated 
performance metrics and MOE. Concurrently, research and evaluation can determine how 
these metrics will be affected by teams of both manned and autonomous agents acting in 
a collaborative manner with one another. The organization needs new ways to measure 
performance.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the complicated ethical and legal 
dilemmas associated with machine automated employment of firepower within the 
warfighting environment need a great deal more thought and study. Even if human 
supervisory “influence” can be maintained, this prospect poses serious problems for the 
“human in the loop,” especially given the speed with which this type of action might 
occur. Furthermore, the question of just how AVS employed in this manner impact our 
understanding of the laws of warfare needs detailed exploration. To be sure, there are 
already questions being raised about the nature of UAS used in precision strike roles 
against insurgent targets in the skies over Afghanistan. These questions are perhaps 
stemming from a realization of the next level of future technology development. The 
capability is coming; “we” had better be ready.  
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